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INTRODUCTION 
1. The European Council, meeting at Corfu on 24 and 25 June 1994, decided 
to set up a Study Group to prepare for the work of the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference provided for under Article N(2) of the Treaty on European Union. It 
invited the institutions, before the Study Group begins its work on 1 June 1995, to 
draw up reports on the operation of the Treaty on European Union. 
2. In responding to that request, the Court of Justice must reconcile its concern 
to provide a useful contribution to the work of the Group with the duty of 
discretion incumbent upon it as a judicial institution. 
Under the revision procedure laid down by the Treaties, it is essentially the 
Member States who have the task of drawing up and approving such amendments 
as are deemed necessary to meet the requirements of a Union which is, necessarily, 
always in a state of evolution. In that context, the Court's duty is to indicate what 
is needed, or indeed indispensable, to allow the judicial system of the Union to 
continue carrying out its task effectively. It is of the utmost importance that the 
Union, based on the principle of the rule of law, should possess a system of courts 
capable of ensuring that that rule is observed. 
This report will therefore concentrate on the judicial system and will touch 
on other aspects only in so far as they may have implications for its operation. 
After first outlining the role of the judicature within the framework of the 
Union, the Court's report will deal with the application of certain provisions of the 
Treaty on European Union, and submit observations on prospective amendments 
affecting or likely to have repercussions on the judicial system. 
I - THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
3. The Union, like the European Communities on which it is founded, is 
governed by the rule of law. Its very existence is conditional on recognition by the 
Member States, by the institutions and by individuals of the binding nature of its 
rules. 
The Court of Justice, which is charged with ensuring that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed, is responsible for 
monitoring the legality of acts and the uniform application of the common rules. 
The Treaties, the protocols annexed to certain conventions between Member 
States, and certain agreements concluded by the Communities with non-member 
States, confer various kinds of jurisdiction upon the Court. It is called on to rule 
on direct actions brought by the Member States, by the institutions and by 
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individuals; to maintain close cooperation with national courts and tribunals 
through the preliminary ruling procedure; and to give opinions on certain 
agreements envisaged by the Communities. The Court thus carries out tasks which, 
in the legal systems of the Member States, are those of the constitutional courts, 
the courts of general jurisdiction or the administrative courts or tribunals, as the 
case may be. 
In its constitutional role, the Court rules on the respective powers of the 
Communities and of the Member States, and on those of the Communities in 
relation to other forms of cooperation within the framework of the Union and, 
generally, determines the scope of the provisions of the Treaties whose observance 
it is its duty to ensure. It ensures that the delimitation of powers between the 
institutions is safeguarded, thereby helping to maintain the institutional balance. 
It examines whether fundamental rights and general principles of law have been 
observed by the institutions, and by the Member States when their actions fall 
within the scope of Community law. It rules on the relationship between 
Community law and national law and on the reciprocal obligations between the 
Member States and the Community institutions. Finally, it may be called upon to 
judge whether international commitments envisaged by the Communities are 
compatible with the Treaties. 
As regards the remainder of the Court's jurisdiction, the setting up of a two-
tier system for all actions brought by natural or legal persons, which are now dealt 
with by the Court of First Instance subject to the possibility of an appeal to the 
Court of Justice, has undoubtedly afforded greater protection to individuals and has 
enabled the latter to devote itself more fully to its essential task of ensuring the 
uniform interpretation of the law, under conditions which preserve the quality and 
efficiency of the judicial system. 
4. The Court considers it indispensable, if the essential features of the 
Community legal order are to be maintained, that the functions and prerogatives 
of its judicial organs be safeguarded in the forthcoming process of revision. The 
success of Community law in embedding itself so thoroughly in the legal life of the 
Member States is due to its having been perceived, interpreted and applied by the . 
nationals, the administrations and the courts and tribunals of all the Member States 
as a uniform body of rules upon which individuals may rely in their national courts. 
Even before there was the idea of citizenship of the Union, the Court had inferred 
from the Treaties the concept of a new legal order applying to individuals and had 
in many cases ensured that those individuals could exercise effectively the rights 
conferred upon them. 
Any decision affecting the structure of the judicial system must therefore 
ensure that the courts remain independent and their judgments binding. Were that 
not to be the case, the very foundations of the Community legal order would be 
undermined. 
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By virtue of Article L of the Treaty on European Union, the Court of 
Justice has, for all practical purposes, no jurisdiction over activities of the Union 
which fall within the spheres of common foreign and security policy and of 
cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs.1 In that regard, the attention 
of the Intergovernmental Conference should be drawn to the legal problems which 
may arise in the long, or even the short, term. Thus, it is obvious that judicial 
protection of individuals affected by the activities of the Union, especially in the 
context of cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, must be guaranteed 
and structured in such a way as to ensure consistent interpretation and application 
both of Community law and of the provisions adopted within the framework of 
such cooperation. Further, it may be necessary to determine the limits of the 
powers of the Union vis-a-vis the Member States, and of those of each of the 
institutions of the Union. Finally, proper machinery should be set up to ensure the 
uniform implementation of the decisions taken. 
5. It is obvious that the need to ensure uniform interpretation and application 
of Community law and of the conventions which are inseparably bound up with the 
achievement of the objectives of the Treaties presupposes the existence of a single 
judicial body, such as the Court of Justice, which can give definitive rulings on the 
law for the whole of the Community. That requirement is essential in any case 
which is constitutional in character or which otherwise raises a question of 
importance for the development of the law. 
II - THE APPLICATION OF THE TREA1Y ON EUROPEAN UNION 
6. As far as the Court of Justice is concerned, the effect of the amendments 
introduced by the Treaty on European Union has· to date been only limited. The 
reasons for that are, firstly, that the Treaty has only recently come into force and, 
secondly, that a certain period is bound to elapse between the introduction of 
procedures or the implementation of provisions, and their repercussions in terms 
of litigation. 
7. At a formal level, the amendments required by the Treaty on European 
Union have been made to the EC Statute of the Court and to the Rules of 
Procedure both of the Court of Justice and of the Court of First Instance. The 
amendments to the Statute were approved by the Council, at the request of the 
1 - In its order of 7 April 1995 in Case C-167/94 Grau Gomis and Others, not yet published 
in the ECR, the Court held that it had no jurisdiction, in the context of a preliminary 
ruling, to interpret Article B of the Treaty on European Union. 
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Court, by decision of 22 December 1994.2 The Court of Justice adopted the 
amendments to its Rules of Procedure on 21 February 1995, following approval by 
the Council.3 The Court of First Instance adopted the amendments to its Rules 
of Procedure on 17 February 1995, following approval by the Council and with the 
agreement of the Court of Justice.4 
8. At a practical level, as yet the first innovation to have borne fruit to any 
appreciable extent is the one whose implementation depended on the Court itself, 
namely the new version of Article 165(3). Under that provision, the Court of 
Justice may now assign any case to a Chamber unless a Member State or an 
institution which is a party to the proceedings requests that the case be heard in 
plenary session. Whilst cases raising fundamental issues are still heard in plenary 
session, the Court makes regular use of this new possibility in cases which 
previously had to be heard by the plenary. This has probably contributed to the 
shortening of the length of proceedings revealed in the most recent statistics.5 
That achievement has been made possible by the attitude of the Member States 
and the institutions, which have confined to exceptional cases their requests that 
the Court sit in plenary session. 
9. As regards the other Treaty amendments of direct concern to the Court, one 
action has been brought under the new version of Article 173(1) of the EC Treaty, 
for annulment of a measure adopted by the European Parliament and the Council 
in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 189b of the EC Treaty.6 
The new version of Article 173(1) of the EC Treaty, which endorses the 
solution provided by the Court's case-law7, namely that an action for annulment 
may lie against measures adopted by the European Parliament intended to have 
2 - OJ 1994 L 379, p. 1. 
3 - OJ 1995 L 44, p. 61. 
4 - OJ 1995 L 44, p. 64. 
5 - Between 1993 and 1994, the average length of proceedings for direct actions before the 
Court of Justice went from 22.9 months to 20.8 months; for preliminary rulings from 20.4 
to 18.0 months; and for appeals from 19.2 to 21.2 months. The last figure is due in 
particular to the relative increase in the number of appeals in the field of competition, 
which are often long and complex, compared with those in Community staff cases. 
6 - Case C-233/94 Gemiany v Parliament and Council. 
7 - Case 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339. 
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legal effects vis-a-vis third parties, has also formed the basis for a recent action 
brought by the Council.8 
Similarly, the European Parliament, whose right to bring an action for 
annulment of an act of the Council or the Commission in order to safeguard its 
prerogatives had already been recognized9 and indeed exercised on a number of 
occasions before the Treaty on European Union entered into force, has been able 
to bring three further actions for annulment10 on the basis of the new version of 
Article 173(3) of the EC Treaty, which endorses the previous case-law. 
The Court has not been called upon to apply the other amendments relating 
specifically to the judicial system of the Union. That is true, for example, of the 
new version of Article 171 of the EC Treaty ( and of the corresponding provision 
of the Euratom Treaty), which enables the Commission to bring an action before 
the Court of Justice seeking imposition of penalties on a Member State which has 
failed to comply with a judgment finding that it had infringed the Treaty; similarly 
there have been as yet no cases concerning the European Monetary Institute or 
pursuant to the last subparagraph of Article K.3(2)(c) of the Treaty on European 
Union, which allows attribution of jurisdiction to the Court of Justice in respect of 
the interpretation and application of conventions concluded within the framework 
of cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs.11 
As regards the new version of Article 168a of the EC Treaty (and the 
corresponding provisions of the ECSC and Euratom Treaties), which makes it 
possible to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance to hear and determine 
certain classes of action or proceedings brought by the Member States or the 
institutions, with the exception of questions referred for a preliminary ruling, the 
Court of Justice considers that the possibility of applying that provision can only be 
evaluated in the light of experience gained from exercise by the Court of First 
8 - Case C-41/95 Council v Parliament. 
9 - Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council (1990] ECR I-2041. 
10 - Case C-21/94 Parliament v Council, Case C-271/94 Parliament v Council and Case C-303/94 
Parliament v Council. 
11 - The only convention of that type yet signed, the Convention on simplified extradition 
procedure between the Member States of the European Union, drawn up by Council Act 
of 10 March 1995 (OJ 1995 C 78, p. 1) does not give any jurisdiction to the Court of 
Justice. 
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Instance of the jurisdiction recently transferred to it to hear and determine actions 
brought by individuals.12 
10. Some of the other amendments introduced by the Treaty on European 
Union have already given rise to cases currently pending before the Court of 
Justice. 
These include the principle of subsidiarity embodied in Article 3b of the EC 
Treaty, 13 the new provisions relating to movement of capital in Articles 73b to 73h 
of that Treaty14 and certain of the new legal bases introduced into the EC 
Treaty.15 
III - POSSIBLE REVISION OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
11. The development of the Community legal order has been to a large extent 
the fruit of the dialogue which has built up between the national courts and the 
Court of Justice through the preliminary ruling procedure. It is through such 
cooperation that the essential characteristics of the Community legal order have 
been identified, in particular its primacy over the laws of the Member States, the 
direct effect of a whole series of provisions and the right of individuals to obtain 
redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for which a 
Member State is responsible. To limit access to the Court would have the effect 
of jeopardizing the uniform application and interpretation of Community law 
throughout the Union, and could deprive individuals of effective judicial protection 
and undermine the unity of the case-law. 
But that is not all. The preliminary ruling system is the veritable 
cornerstone of the operation of the internal market, since it plays a fundamental 
role in ensuring that the law established by the Treaties retains its Community 
12 - Council Decision 93/350/Euratom, ECSC, EEC of 8 June 1993 (OJ 1993 L 144, p. 21) and 
Council Decision 94/149/ECSC, EC of 7 March 1994 (OJ 1994 L 66, p. 29). 
13 - Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council and Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and 
Council. 
14 - Case C-163/94 Ministerio Fiscal v Sanz de Lera, Case C-165/94 Ministerio Fiscal v D{az 
Jimenez, C-250/94 Ministerio Fiscal v Kapanoglu, Case C-294/94 Ministerio Fiscal v 
Quintanilha and Case C-20/95 Ministerio Fiscal v Weg. 
15 - Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council and Case C-271/94 Parliament v Council. 
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character with a view to guaranteeing that that law has the same effect in all 
circumstances in all the Member States of the European Union. Any weakening, 
even if only potential, of the uniform application and interpretation of Community 
law throughout the Union would be liable to give rise to distortions of competition 
and discrimination between economic operators, thus jeopardizing equality of 
opportunity as between those operators and consequently the proper functioning 
of the internal market. 
One of the Court's essential tasks is to ensure just such a uniform 
interpretation, and it discharges that duty by answering the questions put to it by 
the national courts and tribunals. The possibility of referring a question to the 
Court of Justice must therefore remain open to all those courts and tribunals. 
It is true that the effectiveness of the preliminary ruling procedure, which 
from a technical point of view is merely a step in the national proceedings, depends 
on the time it takes. If it takes too long, national courts may be discouraged from 
submitting questions for a preliminary ruling. The Court is aware of the need to 
reduce further the time taken to deal with such questions and would stress in that 
connection that the recent transfer to the Court of First Instance of all direct 
actions brought by individuals should make it possible to obtain a significant 
reduction in the time taken for other types of proceedings, in particular references 
for a preliminary ruling. 
The Court is currently exammmg further measures to increase its 
productivity. It should be pointed out in that regard that for cases of great 
importance - particularly constitutional or economic importance - it is hardly 
possible, or even desirable, to speed up the proceedings before the Court. For 
cases of lesser importance, however, procedural simplification may certainly be 
envisaged and could have beneficial effects. The measures necessary for that 
purpose fall within the framework of the Statute of the Court and its Rules of 
Procedure, or are pure matters of practice, and do not require any amendment to 
the Treaties. 
12. In view of the considerable period of time which elapsed before its Rules 
of Procedure were adapted in line with the Treaty on European Union (it was not 
possible to adopt the necessary amendments until February 1995), the Court 
considers that the rule in Article 188(3) of the EC Treaty ( and in the corresponding 
provisions of the other Treaties), which requires the unanimous approval of the 
Council for any amendment to those Rules, should be relaxed. Thus, the Court 
might be authorized to adopt its Rules of Procedure without the approval of the 
Council or, if the Member States felt it indispensable to retain the right to be 
consulted, such approval might be deemed to be given on expiry of a specified 
period in the absence of amendments by the Council to the Court's proposal. A 
similar amendment would need to be made to Article 168a( 4) of the EC Treaty 
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and to the corresponding provisions of the other Treaties concerning the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of First Instance. 
13. In its requests submitted to the Council following the introduction of a two-
tier court system, the Court of Justice has already stressed that such a system is not 
appropriate for preliminary ruling procedures both because it would be likely to 
lead to unacceptable procedural delays and because it would raise problems as to 
the authority of judgments given at first instance and as to identification of the 
parties entitled to lodge an appeal. The Court's jurisdiction to give preliminary 
rulings cannot be split up on the basis of pre-established criteria relating to the 
subject-matter of the case or the status of the referring court, which might 
jeopardize the consistency of the case-law, or on the basis of a flexible system of 
case-by-case referrals from the Court of Justice to the Court of First Instance, 
which might run counter to certain conceptions of the 'lawful judge' (juge legal). 
14. The Court has been informed of certain proposals, first, for amending 
Article 173 of the EC Treaty and the corresponding provisions of the other 
Treaties to allow the European Parliament to bring actions for annulment without 
having to establish an interest and, second, for giving the Parliament the right to 
request the Court's opinion on an international agreement envisaged by the 
Community, in accordance with Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty. It is, of course, 
for the Intergovernmental Conference to decide what action is to be taken on those 
proposals. The Court wishes to point out that there should be no technical 
objection to such amendments and that, as regards the procedure for obtaining 
opinions, it has already allowed the Parliament to submit observations in 
connection with requests made by Member States, the Council or the Commission. 
However, the Court doubts whether it would be appropriate to remove to the 
judicial arena disputes which could just as satisfactorily be settled at a political 
level, given the mechanisms provided for that purpose. 
15. The Court has begun to reflect on the future judicial structure of the Union. 
The organization of the judicial system will in any event depend on political 
decisions as regards developing the process of union among the peoples of Europe 
and as regards the prospects of further enlargement. 
At the present stage of development, the Court feels that the structure of 
the judicial system should not be altered. In particular, there seems to be no need 
to amend Article 168a of the EC Treaty and the corresponding provisions of the 
other Treaties with regard to the allocation of tasks between the Court of Justice 
and the Court of First Instance. A more detailed assessment cannot be made until 
it has become possible to evaluate the capacity of both Courts to deal satisfactorily 
with the volume of litigation assigned to them. In any case, the obvious need to 
maintain an efficient court system means that the number of courts should not be 
increased unless there are objective reasons for doing so, particularly since the 
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national courts are called upon to play a central role as the courts with general 
jurisdiction for Community law. 
However, if closer integration is achieved in certain fields, with a 
concomitant increase in the volume of litigation, it might be that, in the longer 
term, it would be desirable for the Chambers of the Court of First Instance to 
become specialized or perhaps for new specialized Community courts to be 
established. Once the principle of the two-tier system is accepted, there is a certain 
logic in having the vast majority of direct actions dealt with by one or more courts 
of first instance and in subjecting certain appeals to the Court of Justice to a 
filtering system. Increasing the number of courts would be unlikely to endanger the 
unity of the case-law provided there is still a supreme court to ensure uniformity 
of interpretation through appeals or preliminary rulings as the case may be. 
16. With regard to the prospects of enlargement of the Union, the Court wishes 
to draw the attention of the Intergovernmental Conference to the problem of 
maintaining the link between the number of Judges and the number of Member 
States, even though the Treaties do not provide for any link between nationality 
and membership of the Court. 
In that regard, two factors must be balanced. 
On the one hand, any significant increase in the number of Judges might 
mean that the plenary session of the Court would cross the invisible boundary 
between a collegiate court and a deliberative assembly. Moreover, as the great 
majority of cases would be heard by Chambers, this increase could pose a threat 
to the consistency of the case-law. 
On the other hand, the presence of members from all the national legal 
systems on the Court is undoubtedly conducive ·to harmonious development of 
Community case-law, taking into account concepts regarded as fundamental in the 
various Member States and thus enhancing the acceptability of the solutions arrived 
at. It may also be considered that the presence of a Judge from each Member 
State enhances the legitimacy of the Court. 
Finally, it should be noted that the question of the number of Judges arises 
in a completely different way in the Court of First Instance, which normally sits in 
Chambers and whose decisions are subject to an appeal to the Court of Justice. 
17. The Court does not intend to express any opinion with regard to the 
procedure for the appointment of its members or the term of their appointment, 
beyond those aspects which concern the preservation of its independence and its 
functional efficiency. 
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The Court stresses that the procedure for appointment laid down by the 
Treaties and the practice generally followed in renewing the terms of office of its 
members have satisfactorily ensured its independence and the continuity of its case-
law. The Court would not, however, object to a reform which would involve an 
extension of the term of office with a concomitant condition that the appointment 
be non-renewable. Such a reform would provide an even firmer basis for the 
independence of its members and would strengthen the continuity of its case-law. 
Provided that the fixed term of appointment of each member were calculated from 
the time of taking office, such a solution would also have the advantage, over time, 
of limiting the operational inconveniences regularly suffered by the Court's activities 
as a result of the partial replacement rule. 
However, without needing to express an opinion at this stage on the other 
proposals which have been put forward, the Court considers that a reform involving 
a hearing of each nominee by a parliamentary committee would be unacceptable. 
Prospective appointees would be unable adequately to answer the questions put to 
them without betraying the discretion incumbent upon persons whose independence 
must, in the words of the Treaties, be beyond doubt and without prejudging 
positions they might have to adopt with regard to contentious issues which they 
would have to decide in the exercise of their judicial function. 
18. The Court would like to put forward once again the suggestion, already 
raised during the preparations for the Treaty on European Union, that Article 
167(5) of the EC Treaty (and the corresponding provisions of the ECSC and 
Eura tom Treaties) should be amended to allow the Advocates General as well as 
the Judges to take part in the election of the President of the Court from among 
the Judges. The basis for that proposal lies in the fact that the status of Advocate 
General is identical to that of Judge; without prejudice to their specific function, 
they are members of the Court in the same way as the Judges. As such, moreover, 
they have the same responsibilities with regard to administrative decisions and are 
concerned in the same way with the functioning of the institution. Since the 
President organizes the business and directs the administration of the Court, it 
would be perfectly logical for the Advocates General to take part in the election 
together with the Judges. It is evident that the President, who directs the hearings 
and deliberations of the Court sitting in plenary session, can be chosen only from 
among the Judges. The Advocates General would thus be entitled to vote but not 
to stand for election. 
[ 
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IV - REPERCUSSIONS ON THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF CERTAIN 
AMENDMENTS ENVISAGED 
19. The Court is aware that the Intergovernmental Conference is called upon 
to examine problems of a constitutional nature, such as changes in the 
nomenclature of acts and the introduction of a hierarchy of norms, together with 
the introduction into the Treaty of a catalogue of fundamental rights in keeping 
with the democratic nature of the Union, which renders the protection of human 
rights an essential element of European construction. Whilst it is not for the Court 
to express a view on the desirability of such reforms, it nevertheless notes that they 
have important aspects which will necessarily have repercussions on the system of 
judicial review. 
20. In the first place, if a catalogue of fundamental rights were to be introduced 
into the text of the Treaty, the question would arise as to the mechanism for 
reviewing observance of those rights in legislative and administrative measures 
adopted in the framework of Community law. 
In the exercise of its present jurisdiction, the Court already examines 
whether fundamental rights have been respected by the legislative and executive 
authorities of the Communities and by the Member States when their actions fall 
within the field of Community law. In doing so, it draws on the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States and on the international instruments 
relating to the protection of human rights in which the Member States have 
cooperated or to which they are parties, in particular the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The Court would not, therefore, be taking on a new role in 
reviewing respect for of such fundamental rights as might be provided for in the 
Treaty. It may be asked, however, whether the right to bring an action for 
annulment under Article 173 of the EC Treaty ( and the corresponding provisions 
of the other Treaties), which individuals enjoy only in regard to acts of direct and 
individual concern to them, is sufficient to guarantee for them effective judicial 
protection against possible infringements of their fundamental rights arising from 
the legislative activity of the institutions. 
21. Secondly, if the Intergovernmental Conference were to decide to revise the 
nomenclature of the acts of the institutions and possibly to establish a hierarchy 
amongst those acts, it would be essential to take account of the consequences which 
such changes would have for the system of remedies, in particular the right of 
individuals to bring actions for the annulment of such acts. 
22. It would be premature to formulate any more detailed observations but, in 
view of the fundamental importance of those matters for the judicial protection of 
individuals, the Court wishes to be involved at the appropriate moment in any 
process of reflection. 
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23. Finally, in the Court's opinion, the forthcoming process of revision might 
provide an opportunity for codifying and streamlining the constitutive Treaties. 
The multiplicity of Treaties forming the constitutional basis for the law of the 
Union, of which one (the ECSC Treaty) expires in July 2002, the sometimes 
artificial compartmentalization entailed by the system of three pillars, the survival 
of many superseded or obsolete provisions, and a numbering system which uses 
both letters and figures, all run counter to the need for transparency and put 
citizens of the Union in an unsatisfactory position from the point of view of legal 
certainty. 
* * * * * 
24. The Court has confined itself, at the present stage, to expressing 
observations of a general nature concerning, essentially, the judicial sphere. The 
Court reserves the possibility of submitting to the Study Group its observations on 
the reports of the other institutions in so far as they concern the judicial system or 
include proposals likely to have repercussions on it. Furthermore, the Court would 
like to be associated in an appropriate manner with the preparatory work prior to 
the revision of the Treaties. In any event, the Court must be consulted should the 
Intergovernmental Conference intend to amend the Treaty provisions relating to 
the judicial system. 
, 
